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CONTRACTS
EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY OF CONSIDERATION ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF BUILDING CONTRACTS
Plaintiff, a building contractor, entered into a contract to brick-
veneer the defendants' residence, the bricks to be laid on their two-inch
face. Defendants refused to pay and plaintiff sued for the contract price
ond other relief. Defendants urged that the contract was illegal under
a provision of the Cincinnati building code, which provided that masonry
veneer should not be less than four inches thick.' The section was intro-
duced in evidence; others which made it unlawful to "maintain, occupy,
or use" a building erected in violation of the code, and provided a penalty
for violation, were merely mentioned in counsel's brief. The Court
stated that defendants were entitled to rely only on the section introduced
in evidence, but decided the case in the light of all the sections referred
to above. It nevertheless affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff.'
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 580, declares
any bargain illegal if either the formation or performance is prohibited
by statute. It specifies five indicia of legislative intent to prohibit, in-
cluding the imposition of a penalty. The decided cases in general
support this view. Even though the statute, or ordinance (treated as
equivalents) does not expressly make the bargain or performance there-
under unlawful, it is held that the imposition of a penalty implies the
illegality of the contract, and renders it unenforceable. Certain Ohio
cases are in accord with this view.3
The general rule finds its clearest justification where the statute
or ordinance is enacted under the police power of the state to protect
the health, safety, or morals of the public, or to protect the public
from fraud.' The Courts have, however, recognized certain exceptions.'
'Section 166j-4. Masonry veneer . . . Masonry veneer shall . . . be not less than
4 inchcv thick for more than one story ....
" FLcher-Liemann Construction Co. v. Haase, et al., 64 Ohio App. 473, Is Ohio Op.
209, 29 N.E. (2d) 46 (1940).
'Massillon Savings & Loan Co. v. Finance Co., 114 Ohio St. 523, 5Z7, 151 N.E.
645 (x9z6); Ohio Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Todino, iii Ohio St. 274, 125 N.E. z5 (i9z4),
overruled by Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, zzo Ohio St. 68, 166 N.E. So8 (29z9);
Crnvi v. Toledo Scale Co., 89 Ohio St. 168, xo6 N.E. 8 (1913); B. & 0. R. R. v.
Diamond Coal Co., 61 Ohio St. 242, 55 N.E. 616 (i899); Penna. R. R. Co. v. Wentz,
;7 Ohio St. 333 (iSSi)5 Hooker v. De Palos, 2S Ohio St. zS (1876)5 Spurgeon v.
McElwain, 6 Ohio 44z, Z7 Am. Dec. 266 (834); Jackson v. Bryant, 33 Ohio App. 4 68,
169 N.E. 825 (i9z9); Tillinghast v. Craig, 9 Ohio C.D. 459, 17 Ohio C.C. 532 (1893)i
2.80Oho N. P. (N .s.) 319 (1930).
"Miller v. Ammon, 45 U.S. 422 (189z); Levison v. Boas, 15o Cal. 85, 88 Pac.
X25 (2907); Smith v. Robertson, xo6 Ky. 472, 5o S.W. S52, 45 L.R.A. 510 (1899);
Randall v. Tuell, 89 Maine 443, 36 Atl. 92o (1897); Eastern Expanded Metal Co. v.
Wcbb Granite Co., 195 Mass. 356, Si N.E. zsx, ii Ann. Cas. 632 (1907); Cashin v.
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The exception most important for our purposes is that based on the
presumed intent of the legislature that the remedies on the contract shall
be unaffected, to be determined from the language of the statute, the
subject matter, the expressed purpose, the wrong it seeks to remedy, and
general surrounding circumstances.! This doctrine of legislative intent
is the basis of many Ohio decisions.'
The Courts, in construing legislative intent, have not laid down
clear guiding principles.' In cases involving title to real property, the
courts have usually held the contract valid to prevent disturbance of
title.' In cases involving title to personal property, there is more con-
flict, but a number of courts, including Ohio's, have held these contracts
valid. 10
In the principal case, the Court applied the doctrine of presumed
legislative intent to a contract for furnishing labor and materials. Al-
though the weight of authority is contra," the position taken by the
principal case seems just in view of the extreme forfeiture and com-
paratively minor turpitude involved.' The Court has here balanced
Pliter, 168 Mich. 386, 134 N.W. 48z (19i2)i McManus v. Fulton, 85 Mont. 170, 278
Pac. sz6 (19z9); N. Y. Cent. & Hudson R. R. Co. v. Williams, i99 N. Y. zoS (1xgo);
Burger v. Roelsch, z8 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1894); Beman v. Tugnot, 7 N.Y. Super. 553
(1851). But where the sole or main purpose of the statute is to obtain revenue, the
courts have been far more reluctant to permit forfeitures and have normally allowed
recovery on the contract. Sunflower Lumber Co. v. Turner Supply Co., s58 Ala. 19i, 48 So.
5SIo (igog)5 Hughes v. Snell, z8 Okl. 8z8, iiS Pac. isoS (1911).
'The Courts will enforce a contract, although the act is prohibited by penal statute,
if the person seeking relief is one of a class for whose benefit or protection the statute
was enacted. Bowditch v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141 Mass. 29z, 4 N.E.
798 (1886)i Musser's Ex'r v. Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577 (876); Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. McMillan, 24 Ohio St. 67, (873); Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Pollack, s8x
Okl. z66, 73 Pac. (2d) 427 (1937). Under this theory creditors, investors, and borrowers
have been allowed recovery even though Fictitious Name Statutes, Blue Sky Laws, and
Usury Statutes, respectively, have been violated. 45 A.L.R. 279-80.
'Harris v. Runnels, iz Howard 79 (U.S. 18Sx); Panghorn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa
(1873); Niemeyer v. Wright 75 Va. 239 (1881); Middleton v. Arnolds, 13 Gratt 489
(Va. x856).
"Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, supra, note 3; Warren People's Market Co. v.
Corbett & Sons, 114 Ohio St. 126, 151 N.E. 5 (1926); Tod v. Wick Bros. & Co., 36
Ohio St. 370 (i88s); Vining v. Bricker, 14 Ohio St. 331 (i863); Rossman v. McFar-
land, 9 Ohio St. 367 (z859); State v. Buttles, 3 Ohio St. 309 (1854)i Strong v. Darling
& Walcott, 9 Ohio zo (1839).
'The imposition of a recurring penalty is generally deemed to evidence an intent that
the contract should be unenforceable. 30 A.L.R. 835. On the other hand, a statute may,
by proviso or otherwise, clearly show that it was not intended to affect civil liability.
Tod v. Wick Bros. & Co., Vining v. Bricker, sopra, note 7; Niemeyer v. Wright, supra,
note 6.
0 Panghorn v. Westlake, Middleton v. Arnolds, both supra, note 7; Strong v. Darling
& Walcott, supra, note 7.
10 Harris v. Runnels, Niemeyer v. Wright, both supra, note 6; Commercial Credit
Co. v. Schreyer, supra, note 3 5 Warren People's Market Co. v. Corbett, Vining v. Bricker,
both supra, note 7-
'Randall v. Tuell, Burger v. Roelsch, Beman v. Tugnot, all supra, note 4; Spurgeon
v. McElwain, supra, note 3.
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the social policy of not enforcing illegal contracts in order to prevent
their formation, against the equities of the parties in the particular case,
and found the latter more persuasive. Since the parties are in pari delicto,
this position is not untenable,' but not many courts will permit recovery,
even in quasi-contracts. 4 .
J.B.S.
CONVEYANCES
COVENANT AGAINST INCUMBRANCES
The plaintiff purchased a lot from the defendant by warranty deed
with covenant against incumbrances. A natural watercourse on the
premises had been covered with concrete and sod in such a manner
that it was not visible, and neither party knew of its existence. This
covering collapsed causing damage to the building on the property. In
a suit against the grantor, the court held that the concealed watercourse,
which had existed less than twenty-one years, was not such an incum-
brance as to constitute a breach of the covenant against incumbrances.'
When a purchaser is injured by defective tide in the realty pur-
chased, he usually must seek his recourse through an action for breach
of an express covenant. In real property there are few implied war-
ranties, in the absence of statutes creating them, and, except in the case
of leases, none are implied from the mere conveyance of land.2 Where
the defect in title is not inconsistent with the passing of the estate, as in
the principal case, the covenant against incumbrances seems the plausible
one on which to seek recovery. It is sometimes said that the covenant
against incumbrances warrants against any right or interest of another
to the diminution of the value or use of the land, but not inconsistent
with the passing of the estate.3 This covenant extends to easements,4
13The Courts dislike having one wrongdoer subjected to a severe forfeiture and the
other unjustly enriched. When the infraction of law is minor, they try to prevent this.
Note (1913) 26 HARv. L.R. 739-
"' Cashin v. Pliter, Randall v. Tuell, both supra, note 4i Peck v. Sands, x98 N.Y.
Supp. 313, 119 Misc. 80. (1922)i Peacock, Woodside & Co. v. Grannan, 2 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 465, 3 W.L.M.i55(i86i).
'Zoyteck v. Peoples Savings Bank Co., 6S Ohio App. is8 (5940).
2 Peoples Savings Bank Co. v. Parsiette et al., 68 Ohio St. 450, 67 N.E. 896 (1913)i
Nelson v. Hamilton County, 10Z Iowa 229, 71 N.W. zo6 (1897)5 Thorp v. Keokuk
Coal Co., 48 N.Y. 253 (1872)5 Van Doren v. Fenton, 125 Wis. '47, 103 N.W. zz8
(190S); Wheeler v. Wayne Co., 13Z II. 599, z4. N.E. 6z5 (i8go).
'Stanbaugh v. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 584 (I873); Peoples Savings Bank Co. v. Par-
siette et al.j 68 Ohio St. 450, 67 N.E. 896 (1903)5 61 A.L.R. 725 RAwLz, CovarNA.s,
Sec. 8g.
' Fassnacht v. Bessinger, 35 Ohio App. 509, 172 N.E. 636, (1930); Kunkle v. Beck
i Ohio App. 70 (1913).
